Myanmar steps from the shadows

Strategic Review, 15 October 2014

By Dr Hassan Wirajuda 

In November, Myanmar will host both the ASEAN Leaders Summit and the East Asia Summit. Organizing two major international conferences is no small task, but in this case Myanmar deserves special attention – and commendation – given where it came back from to lead ASEAN in 2014, and host the likes of US President Barack Obama, Chinese President Xi Jinping and probably Russian President Vladimir Putin, in Naypyidaw.

 

A decade ago, Myanmar was an outcast. At a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, Myanmar’s international standing had sunk so low that we had to ask its leaders to skip their scheduled turn as the grouping’s chairman and instead focus their time and energy on addressing their problems – which had also become ASEAN’s problem. These problems were, namely, a democracy deficit and gross human rights violations. In reality, we in ASEAN were basically sanctioning Myanmar and revoking its scheduled turn to chair the grouping in 2006, but we said it in an ASEAN way: “It is better for you to focus on these problems than take your turn as the chair of ASEAN when you are ready.” And they agreed. Interestingly, they were constructing a new convention center and a new airport in preparation for that summit, but they heeded our advice, relinquished their turn and focused on their problems.

 

This was a seminal moment, in particular given that in 2014 Myanmar has been the chair of ASEAN. One never knows what could happen at the leaders summit (think of Cambodia in 2012), but looking at the whole process of Myanmar’s chairmanship of ASEAN this year, they have done quite well.

 

There was a second, and far more profound, seminal moment for Myanmar. In 2010, our neighbor decided to transform the country into an open democratic society. They had adopted a new Constitution two years earlier, clearing the way for elections in 2010 and by-elections in 2012. These were important steps, and in many ways, despite whatever shortcomings they have, Myanmar has been good enough.

 

First, let us look at process of democratization itself. Ironically, the system Myanmar has adopted is similar to the dual military-political role that Indonesia’s Armed Forces had under the late President Soeharto. The Indonesian military was allocated 25 percent of the seats in parliament, which they themselves withdrew from by September 2004. Today, 25 percent of the seats in Myanmar’s parliament are reserved for its Armed Forces. But from my understanding, the role of Myanmar’s military in politics is somewhat more restrained than the Indonesian military’s “dual function” role, which politically was more extensive and assertive during the Soeharto years.

 

During a workshop on security sector reform that I attended in Yangon earlier this year, senior Myanmarese military officers told me they had no intention of playing an active role in politics, unlike the Indonesian military of the past. They said: “Our role is simply to play a balancing role in politics.” And I think they were sincere. Myanmar’s military leaders realize that they will eventually have to completely withdraw from politics. They continued to ask the Indonesians why in the wake of reform, our military was able to quickly withdraw from its political role in 2004, because they said they didn’t think they would be capable of doing it as fast as we did in Indonesia. They said there were obstacles, in particular for the military, including dealing with some 16 minority groups. The government has been able to negotiate ceasefires, but no final peace settlements. That is why, these military officials said, they will have to continue to deal with their minority groups for now using their political role.

 

From the Indonesian side, we understood that their situation is different, but we reminded them that when Myanmar becomes a more democratic society in line with universal democratic values, the military will have to ultimately withdraw from the political stage. They are seriously considering this, but in terms of timing, it will not be as fast as what we achieved in Indonesia. This is nonetheless part of the process of Myanmar becoming an open and democratic society.

 

I have also seen the increasingly important role Myanmar’s civil society is playing in the country’s democratic transition. Think tanks, human rights groups and the National Commission on Human Rights are increasingly important.  As a result, the Myanmar government is more open to outside assistance from and cooperation with many countries, including Western nations, on issues of human rights and democracy. For example, Myanmar sent large delegations to Indonesia this year for our national general elections in April and presidential election in July. When we at the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD) organized a workshop on our elections, we invited three delegates from Myanmar. But they insisted on sending 70 people at their own cost including members of their National Elections Commission and representatives of all the country’s political parties. This is very encouraging because, quietly, the Myanmarese have been very active.

 

But sometimes they have not been so quiet. When the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a workshop on elections and democracy for ASEAN members in Jakarta on the eve of the July 9 presidential poll, the Myanmar delegation was far more forthcoming in the discussions than their counterparts from Singapore, Malaysia and certainly Thailand. They were more open, and it was a sign of their enthusiasm to work with others to improve and speed up their own democratization process. Myanmar’s observance of Indonesia’s 2014 election season and of many workshops sponsored by IPD was clearly a way for them to prepare for their own general elections in 2015.

 

There are many other issues on which Myanmar wants to learn, share information and discuss. Autonomy is a major one. Myanmar today is very much like Indonesia under Soeharto a centralized state. They want to know more about how Indonesia introduced wide-ranging autonomy, including special autonomy for our Aceh and Papua regions. They also wish to learn about our experiences in solving armed rebellions, such as in Aceh, and dealing with the resentment felt in different Indonesian regions due to the strong centralization policy under Soeharto. Indonesia’s experiences dating back to 1998 are very similar to what Myanmar is facing today in the process of making the country more open and democratic.

 

We know there are still some big questions about openness and democracy in Myanmar. Chief among them is whether Aung San Suu Kyi, the famed opposition leader, will be able to stand for the presidency in 2016. Will parliament agree on changes to Myanmar’s Constitution that will ensure Suu Kyi can join the race? The provision bars any Myanmarese whose spouse or children are foreign nationals from being a candidate for president or vice president. Of course, Suu Kyi’s late husband was British, as are her two sons.

 

When I was foreign minister of Indonesia, practically all of us within ASEAN gently pressured Myanmar to allow Suu Kyi to run for a leadership post, such as president or prime minister, at some point. Whether 2016 is finally her time depends on what happens between now and late 2015, when the next general election is scheduled to be held. How many seats will her National League for Democracy win? Will parliament, given that the military controls 25 percent of its seats, amend the Constitution to clear the way for her candidacy?

 

Only time will tell, but it is instructive that Thein Sein, the current president of Myanmar, was quoted last year as saying that he would work to restore the rights of all Myanmar citizens – including the right to run for president. I sense that Thein Sein, who will step down in 2016, is quite open-minded on this issue, although of course the military has the final say on Suu Kyi. I was impressed that Suu Kyi’s relationship with the president and the military was recently characterized as “good,” but her presidential candidacy, in truth, remains an open question.

 

Another issue for Myanmar as it progresses is the plight of its ethnic Rohingya, and the deadly violence and human rights abuses against them in recent years. This is clearly one of the major negative impacts of the country’s democratic transition since 2010. We experienced even more severe violence in Indonesia. Around 5,000 people were killed in communal and ethnic conflicts in the early years of our democratic era Dayaks versus Madurese in Kalimantan, the communal and religious conflicts in Ambon and Poso and so on. So we are sympathetic to the problems that the Myanmar government is facing, which sadly, are part and parcel of any democratic transition. But the country’s leaders and citizens cannot consider the Rohingya issue as “Buddhists versus Muslims” and “citizens versus noncitizens.” For generations, the Rohingya have lived within Myanmar’s borders. This is a message I have shared during my trips to Myanmar, and people today are more open to talk about it. This, to me, is an example of progress.

 

Another issue is security sector reform. While the Myanmar military has reduced its role in both governance and security, the local police force is not an independent institution. It remains under the Army. It was constructive when we held discussions in Yangon about military reform, but we told our hosts that they need to strengthen the police force. It would be incomplete to only discuss security sector reform and the Myanmarese Army becoming a professional military, while the police force is neither well developed nor ready to assume its new responsibility to maintain law and order.

 

In 2012, I visited Naypyidaw, the country’s capital, and met with the National Elections Commission. The chairman told me he was a former general and former member of the junta. But I found that he and his colleagues were at ease to speak about free, fair and democratic elections without any inhibitions.

 

If someone had reservations, they would not speak so openly. So I pressed the issue. I mentioned the 2012 by-elections, when Aung San Suu Kyi’s party won 43 out of 46 seats. And they smiled. It was obvious, I said, that those by-elections were free, fair and democratic, because the government had the ability to manipulate the results as they had done in the past. This, to me, is one key measure of the change that Myanmar has undergone in a short period of time. The international community pays less attention to this growing ability to openly interact with the military, the government and civil society on issues of democratic transition. They are more focused on the Rohingya or whether Suu Kyi will be allowed to run for president. But the big picture here is transition, and I have positive impressions about where Myanmar is going.

 

November’s ASEAN Leaders Meeting and the East Asia Summit will surely give the Myanmar government some much-needed positive publicity. But the country has already hosted a World Economic Forum event and the Southeast Asia Games, both in 2013. And they won more gold medals than Indonesia during those Games. Facing their turn of chairing ASEAN in 2014 and hosting the two summits in November, they were better prepared. And they are better prepared for their ongoing democratic transition than they ever could have been back in 2005. Sometimes, it is best to step aside for your own good.

 

Dr Hassan Wirajuda served as Indonesia's foreign minister from 2001 to 2009. He is a patron of the Institute for Peace and Democracy, and the editor-in-chief of Strategic Review.

Source: http://sr-indonesia.com/in-the-journal/view/myanmar-steps-from-the-shadows