By Adam Malik
Foreign Affairs, January 1968 Issue
Every historical milestone reflects the end as well as
the beginning of an era, and since history is continuity in spite of change, so
the beginning of an era is never a complete disengagement from the past, either
materially or mentally. Such is the case now in Indonesia.
Within her short history as an independent
nation Indonesia has experienced systems of government, political outlook and
conduct which were more than merely different; they were contradictory. But
during both those decades one man remained at the summit of the Indonesian
political scene: Sukarno. His character is by no means easy to describe because
of its many ambiguities. He is a man who loves the mysteries of the night's
darkness, but none the less can enjoy the freshness of a bright day; who knows
how to add flavor to protocol by breaking formal rigidities with touches of
human interest; who smiles or snubs as he expresses his vivid joys or sorrows
to others; who sometimes reveals the positive attitude of an exact scientist
or, again, the intuition of an artist; who knows how to saturate the masses
with emotion and hold them spellbound, but also how to control them with a
minimum of gestures. During serious discussions of problems with his ministers
he could appreciate humorous interruptions by high officials in the role of
court jesters. My personal recollection of him is of a man rich in ideas and
imagination and direct in both his sympathies and antipathies; in short, an
unforgettable character.
In spite of the mistakes which Sukarno made
during his period as President of the Republic, he succeeded in making himself
a rallying point for the Indonesian people in general. It was not easy to build
up a leadership image in a polyethnic country like Indonesia. We must admit
Sukarno's skill in developing his image as Supreme Leader of the Indonesian
Revolution, Extension of the People's Tongue, Bearer of the Mission of the
People's Suffrage and so on. He was able to discredit any politicians who did
not share his political views. Orders to jail anyone who opposed the President
hung like a sword of Damocles above the heads not only of politicians but of
intellectuals and artists, indeed anyone and everyone who was in disagreement
with him.
The atmosphere of threat and insecurity
became more and more oppressive during the years 1959-60. That was the period
in which, with Sukarno's encouragement, the Communist Party (the P.K.I.) gained
its great influence in Indonesian politics. The Institution for Building up the
Revolutionary Spirit was established to compose the ideas, speeches, slogans
and symbols which were to be spread out through the entire nation by means of
courses in building cadres, by discriminatory upgrading and downgrading of
officials and by mass rallies, campaigns and drives. The Institution's aim was
to indoctrinate the Indonesian people with the belief that what Sukarno said
was always right and wise and that the body of his teachings actually
incorporated undeniable and absolute truth. An order was issued to all
newspapers, weeklies and monthlies to reserve columns for the coverage of
"the teachings of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno,"
and they had to comply or be accused of subversion and counterrevolutionary
attitudes.
The climate came closer and closer to
madness, yet an old discredited politician, quoting Hamlet, remarked "how
much system there was in this madness." The idea of revolution, the
unfinished revolution, justified any and every sudden change in political
behavior. It also justified Indonesia's unpredictability in changing allies and
foes in its foreign relations. Similarly, staggering economic conditions had to
be accepted as necessary for the sake of building the nation. Nation-building
and national identity were the slogans, and they were driven to the point where
xenophobia was not just permitted but nourished.
Typical of Bung Karno's views was his
speech of August 17, 1959, known as the Manifesto Politik, abbreviated to
"Manipol" and later ideologized as "Manipolism." One
sentence read, "The whole strength of the people must be canalized into
one vast wave of energy . . . into one irresistible wave of heave ho and pull
together" ("Ho lopis kuntul bans"). It was a period of
collective hypnosis. The mass motto of "heave ho and pull together"
soon became institutionalized in the form of the Front Nasional in which the
P.K.I. was definitely given the role of directing the course of Indonesian
politics. Its success was due not so much to any majority this National Front
possessed or might possibly gain, but to the protective hand of Sukarno who
was, alas, its Chairman. Mainly because of this the P.K.I., a minority, assumed
the quality of a majority. Some elements tended to coöperate with the leftists
at least partly out of loyalty to "Bung Karno" and his teaching that
"the Indonesian Revolution is a leftist revolution."
Bung Karno's absurd "Nasakom"
concept, resulting from his early studies of Marxism, Islam and Nationalism,
became (or was made) a political credo which every political party had to
accept as beyond criticism. On it he intended to build a stable political
platform in Indonesia, even in the whole world, as indicated in his statements
following the abortive communist coup of September 30, 1966. Even in the
traditional August speech which he made in the summer of 1966 he played with
the idea of reviving the Nasakom concept (although he cautiously changed it to
"Nasasos," abbreviating Sos from Socialism, and making it more vague
by adding "plus whatever sort of Nasa it may be"). That speech was
actually the point of no return in the split between Sukarno, protector of the
Communist Party, and the anti-communist masses led by students and supported by
other political groups.
The Provisionary Consultative Council of
People's Representatives has now declared Communism/Marxism-Leninism a
forbidden ideology in Indonesia and the P.K.I. has been banned. Months before
this decree was issued masses of students and militant youths painted the walls
of Djakarta with cynical and insulting statements regarding the P.K.I. and the
Nasakom idea. In some places new meanings were given to the term Nasakom, e.g.
Nas(ution) A(mbil) Kom(ando), meaning "Nasution, yours to command."
Political interpreters explained that the reference to General Nasution really
meant the armed forces.
General Suharto has moved patiently toward
a settlement of the political conflict which followed the abortive communist
coup, showing his good will in trying to solve it as peacefully as possible.
His intricate and sensitive efforts, conducted by gradual phases, caused a
certain amount of confusion and speculation, especially among foreign
observers. A comparison might with some reason be made between his methods and
our traditional Indonesian shadowplay; but the fact remains that national
problems cannot be solved in complete detachment from the prevailing
intellectual and cultural climate. It was not hesitation or reluctance that
slowed the procedure adopted by General Suharto so much as the complicated
character of the person being dealt with. The nuances of feeling and intuition
hidden in that introverted personality presented many riddles and required
delicate manipulation.
II
Such was the picture in 1966-a blend of
uncertainties and hopes. A new leader had been given to the nation, but the old
leader still struggled to postpone his defeat. He was a leader of the past, and
his decline and eventual defeat were an historical necessity. Simultaneously
with his decline there came into being a new generation aware of its
responsibilities. This new young generation had been frustrated by prolonged
suppression, but in spite of terror and threats had determined, in a spirit of
l'amour de risque, to start a history of their own. Calling themselves
"Generation-66," the second generation since "Generation-45"
to have political significance, they have today become a pillar of the New
Order in Indonesia. It is their merit that they were the first to make sure
that the New Order was not to be degraded into a mere slogan and to insist that
it be given meaning as a new social and political way of life based upon the
Constitution.
It is to be hoped that students and
intellectuals can continue to contribute to the country's development. They
will do this effectively only if they can keep their momentum and at the same
time adjust themselves to changing conditions and changing demands. To be
useful, they should adapt their methods of struggle to the shifts in aims and
objectives as Indonesian society develops. This will not be easy, but it can be
done, and I am convinced it will in fact be done in the long years of social,
economic and political reconstruction that lie ahead.
"The freedom of assembly and
association, of expression of spoken and written opinion, shall be provided for
by law," says Article 28 of the Constitution. It sums up the main mission
of the New Order: to restore democracy. This is not as easy as many Westerners
think. Five to six years of brainwashing and indoctrination have left their
traces in the minds of many, even those who are in principle on the side of the
New Order. Some fear the consequences of restoring democracy, while others are
still under the influence of the political prejudices and poisonous effects of
prolonged indoctrination. Time will be needed for complete recovery.
Both Indonesia's leaders and policy-makers
and the Indonesian people as a whole must persist in the determination to
realize the ideal of true democracy. Unless the New Order succeeds in this
mission it is doomed to degenerate into mere sloganism. It was born as a response
to the challenge of tyranny and terror, and it must maintain that challenge
against all forms of absolutism or dictatorship. The system most suitable for
governing our widespread archipelago is that of a unitarian democratic
republic. Retrogression to a dictatorship ruling by the old methods of force
and intimidation would end inevitably in the disintegration of the Indonesian
state.
The question now is whether or not the
democrats of Generation-66 will be able to restore full confidence in
democratic institutions and solve our national problems by the democratic means
provided within the context of the Constitution. Those in positions of
responsibility in the government administration and the armed forces, and the
leaders of political parties, must realize that Indonesia's problems will not
be solved by mere exchanges of abuse, by accusations and counter-accusations or
by making scapegoats of opponents.
In most countries when the military takes
over the running of the government its first act is to abolish or distort the
Constitution. This has led to questions being asked about the possibility that
the political leadership of the armed forces represented by General Suharto
will follow a similar course. The answer to those questions is no. In our case,
the armed forces have committed themselves to restore a constitutional
government and to revive the democratic spirit. General Suharto and the armed
forces have assumed the solemn duty of fulfilling this. I am convinced that
General Suharto wishes to do so, as do also, I hope, all the top military
leaders. If all who belong to the New Order are aware of the responsibility
they share to restore democracy, then the year 1966 will have become in fact a
milestone of Indonesia's coming of age socially and politically.
III
It is over a year now since the government
started tackling its economic problems seriously and systematically.
Substantial progress has been made in controlling inflation, but the economy is
still suffering the after- pains of the drastic operation; at best it can be
described as being in a state of convalescence.
In October 1966 the government began to
correct the ubiquitous controls and gross errors in the allocation of funds
which had prevailed in the past and had finally produced a runaway inflation.
All unproductive spending on monuments and prestige projects was cut off.
Foreign trade was freed from the unrealistic exchange controls which had
handicapped exports and made imports cheap for those who were lucky enough to
procure licenses. Exports and imports were for the first time given a floating
exchange rate to protect foreign trade in the still existing inflationary
conditions. The very high export taxes concealed in the foreign-exchange
regulations were substantially reduced.
During that last quarter of 1966 the
government also approached creditor countries, to which it owes more than $2.5
billion, in an effort to secure a rescheduling of current debt obligations.
Intergovernmental groups met successively in Tokyo and Amsterdam to discuss the
problem. Impressed by the Indonesian Government's serious intention to put its
own house in order, they agreed to reschedule current debt obligations and to
furnish $200 million to support the budget and to ease our balance of payments
in the first year of the stabilization effort. The government insisted that
these fresh loans be given in the form of multi-purpose commodity loans,
primarily to support the budget rather than to finance projects. This form of
international aid is not common, but fortunately the creditors agreed to it. In
all of this, the assistance and counsel of the International Monetary Fund were
invaluable.
The government also submitted to parliament
a budget in which expenditures and revenues (inclusive of foreign aid) were in
balance. It had been a very long time since an Indonesian government had
presented a balanced budget, or indeed a well-prepared budget of any sort.
Although the government had no illusions that a rigid balance could be
maintained throughout 1967, it was determined to introduce budgetary
discipline, begin setting new rules for sounder budgetary practices and make
sure that government budgets should no longer be the source of inflation as in
the past.
A new round of economic measures was
undertaken in February 1967, this time aimed at abolishing subsidies to public
utilities and national oil companies; unless this was done, the budget would
never be in balance. The cost of gasoline, kerosene and diesel oil went up
eightfold and, partly as a consequence, public utility rates had to be raised
twentyfold in order to break even. These rate and price adjustments were a
severe shock to the economy and inevitably had political repercussions, but
there seemed no alternative.
Since then the economy has been painfully
trying to accommodate itself to the new rules and to move from hyperinflation
and excessive government controls to a more stable market economy. The rate of
inflation is still 65 percent per year, but the government is avoiding price
and foreign-exchange controls in an effort to make the policies stick.
The ordeal of stabilization is being widely
felt. The deflationary forces resulting from reduced government spending and
from higher transportation costs and public utility rates have brought hardship
to many of our still- infant domestic industries. The high priority accorded to
exports and the increasing stability of the currency have already produced a
stream of imports; the "empty-shelves economy" of the past is over.
This means that domestic industry still has to make further painful adjustments
to the new competitive situation.
In the final analysis, the success of the
stabilization and rehabilitation program depends on our obtaining sufficient
foreign aid. Budget expenditures had to be cut substantially in the past year
due to shortfalls in foreign aid receipts. Instead of $140 million worth of
development expenditures, only $95 million will have been spent. As a result,
the government could carry out only the most necessary road repairs and
complete one or two high-priority agriculture and irrigation schemes and
certain industrial projects already long under construction.
The 1967 budget for salaries was very
inadequate. The total sum available for salaries, to be distributed among some
two million employees, the armed forces included, amounted to only $240
million. The average salary per government worker thus is about $120 per year.
Low wages create a temptation to government employees and others to make up the
difference between their salaries and the minimum necessary for subsistence for
themselves and their families by taking second jobs or by various devices,
legal or illegal. This poses a problem which only the capacity to raise
salaries gradually can bring under control.
The salary scale in 1967 represented an
improvement over the preceding year, and the reduced rate of inflation adds to
the protection of persons with fixed incomes. Nevertheless, a further
improvement is vitally necessary. The new regime has put great stress on
bettering economic conditions. Although it is not giving the people rosy
promises, it nevertheless is creating expectations. In 1968, a pre-election
year, the new régime will be measured above all by its performance on the
economic front.
The government enjoys several obvious
advantages in dealing with its problems. General Suharto has given it
determined leadership; major political dilemmas have been solved with tact and
without creating unnecessary turmoil. It has struck a happy balance between
continuity and change. Its major support is the military establishment, at the
moment the strongest political entity in the country. A broad consensus exists
about the general direction in which the New Order should move even though
there is ample criticism of the way specific changes are being managed.
Meanwhile the opposition is not very vocal and is not well organized. All this
makes for a relatively strong government with good chances for survival. The
fact remains that the régime has to score substantial successes in the economic
field; it has to "deliver the goods."
For the fiscal year 1968 (which coincides
with the calendar year) we need a larger budget in order to permit improvements
in salaries and larger investments in development. Our first effort will be to
cover routine expenditures by raising domestic revenues some 27 percent in real
terms. If we can achieve this, it will be the first time in Indonesia's
history. In addition, in order to cover a higher development budget, we need
increased foreign aid, if possible the equivalent of $250 million in the same
form as the past year-that is, multi-purpose commodity aid.
Outside the regular operating budget, we
will introduce direct project aid in the form of equipment and capital goods,
mainly to rehabilitate infrastructure projects: roads, harbors, rivers,
railways, generating plants, airways and irrigation facilities. None of these
has had proper replacements since 1961 and most are in very bad repair. Thus
1968 will be an "infrastructure year," aimed at repairing facilities
in order to revive the economy, boost exports and lay a more solid foundation
for the long- range development which we intend to start in 1969.
Ideally, we hope aid may come from the
United States in the calendar year 1968 in the amount of $50 million under
Public Law 480, $50 million in the form of commodity credits and, say, $30
million in the form of capital goods for rehabilitating the infrastructure.
Since we are a nation of 110 million people, such governmental aid would amount
to a little over $1 per head. By comparison with the $65 million of American
aid in the current year, the new figure might appear too hopeful, but if it is
enough to bring stability to a vital region of the world it could be considered
a modest investment.
In addition to governmental aid, Indonesia
is hoping for a good measure of American equity investment. Our foreign
investment policy is an integral part of our overall economic and development
policy. The law passed as a high priority measure in parliament as early as the
last quarter of 1966 provides ample guarantees against expropriation and undue
government interference in management. It provides also for the free transfer
of profits as well as legitimate costs such as expenses for patents, royalties,
insurance and part of the salaries of expatriate employees. After the tax
holiday is over, repatriation of capital will be allowed. Indonesia's great natural
potential and its large domestic market can be developed effectively by private
enterprise, and in this foreign capital can play a very important role. The
government will confine itself to investments in roads, harbors, rail
transport, communications, agriculture, schools and other requirements for
social development and will leave the rest of the economy open to the
initiative of private enterprise. The government also realizes that since it
cannot count on the flow of foreign aid capital continuing indefinitely,
self-help measures are necessary to mobilize the domestic capital which will
one day have to take over the role now being filled by international aid.
In developing countries, however, foreign
equity capital should work in a coöperative manner with the host society.
Foreign investment must become a truly international venture; that is, it must
produce a blend of Western technology and management with local human and
social capacities. Trouble comes if foreign investment creates isolated islands
of modernity in an underdeveloped native sea. Along with the influx of foreign
capital we have to develop an indigenous middle class, which in time should be
as strong as the foreign business class, indeed preferably stronger. This is
imperative if we want to preserve social and political stability. In Indonesia
there is as yet no strong and established middle class, save for the semi-alien
Chinese business community. That is why the government prefers joint
enterprises or joint ventures rather than foreign investments which remain
fully controlled from abroad; but because of the scarcity of Indonesian capital
and entrepreneurs it will not insist on these in the beginning. We want to
develop indigenous entrepreneurs through education and employment, and for this
purpose foreign enterprises are required to train Indonesians and employ local
skills to the extent they are available.
IV
We must give evidence of progress toward
maturity in our handling of international as well as national problems. In our
foreign relations, I regret to say, policy-makers of the past regime destroyed
much good will or at the least did not respond adequately to evidence of it.
The task of the Indonesian Government now is to regain the confidence of some
of the nations which have experienced mistreatment by our predecessors. It will
make every effort to restore relations with other nations in the Indonesian
people's genuine spirit of good will, so long suppressed.
We believe that no nation in this age of
rapid technological progress and scientific advances can live in isolated
self-sufficiency. Even if for the time being we put more stress on our domestic
problems, we are aware of our role among the other nations of the world. The
fact that so much has to be done at home to improve social welfare and develop
natural resources does not indicate any lack of interest in foreign affairs.
Indonesia's main problem today is to
reëstablish her position as a respectable and respected nation based on a
policy described usually as nonalignment. This means that Indonesia will not
become a member of any international bloc, either political or ideological. It
does not mean, however, that Indonesia will take up an attitude of indifference
toward world problems and world conflicts. Indonesia will join with other
nations to promote world peace and good international relations. I must admit
that our good will has not as yet been fully reciprocated; policies of the past
régime have left a certain residue of mistrust abroad. That is why I am making
it my mission as Minister of Foreign Affairs to regain what good will we may
have lost, not by promises but by proving Indonesia a reliable partner in
political as well as business matters.
In this context we are working toward the
establishment of regional coöperation in Southeast Asia. The initiative is not
a new one. The Asian nations, and especially those of Southeast Asia, are aware
of the necessity of coöperation not just for political ends but for the sake of
mutual development. The exchange of experience in nation-building in a world of
rapid social change and technological progress is fruitful not so much because
one can copy from another as because a comparative analysis can prevent the
repetition of mistakes.
The primary reason for regional coöperation
is the necessity for modernization. The developing nations themselves have the
primary responsibility for accelerating the speed of their recovery and
improving their standard of living. Yet other more developed nations have a
duty to help on ethical grounds. Today national leaders must consider the good
not of their nations but of humanity in general. The cultural differences among
the peoples of the world present problems of a quite secondary order compared
with the problems arising from the discrepancies in the basic needs for human
survival. Especially in our region, the question of war or peace is not the
only problem. There is a desperate struggle, too, against poverty, disease,
illiteracy and many other ills. It is a struggle which can be won if the will
exists, by which I mean if the nations of the world will pay enough attention.
With this in mind we look on the establishment of regional coöperation in
Southeast Asia as part of, and in harmony with, international coöperation in
general, the overall object being to improve our standard of living and our
intellectual capacities so that we may keep pace with modern progress or at
least not stay too far behind.
In view of the tremendous growth of the
idea of regional coöperation, which resulted in the establishment of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it might seem logical that part
of the foreign aid given to Indonesia or other countries in the area should be
diverted to multinational regional projects. The fact is, however, that the aid
given directly to Indonesia or other countries of the area is much smaller than
their needs. Because of this, and also because aid varies in kind and purpose
from country to country, a diversion of any part of it does not seem feasible
without curtailing the programs already under way. Such aid as might be
provided for multinational regional projects ought not to interfere, therefore,
with what is given to national economic programs.
No Asian country can detach itself from
anything that happens in Asia. Although Asia is composed of many nations, with
varieties of culture and political and ideological outlook, every part feels
the pulse of every other part. The Chinese Cultural Revolution is an Asian
problem, as the Viet Nam war is also a problem for other parts of Asia. The
same is true of the industrial progress of Japan, which affects certain aspects
of the national economy of other Asian nations. But in a general way we can
almost say that the Asian problem is caused mainly by the fact of transition-
transition from traditional society toward a modernized society, from
colonialized nations toward independence, from more or less tranquil isolation
toward international involvement. Nor are the problems involved rational only;
some of the inhibiting factors are basically emotional in nature.
Psychologically, the situation can be stated in terms of a traumatic
experience-the attempt to achieve self-responsibility in a community of nations
where interdependence is a must.
The idea of regional coöperation is not, of
course, inconsistent with coöperation with other nations in the world, and for
this Indonesia believes that the United Nations is indeed the most suitable
forum. Since its establishment in 1945 the United Nations has undergone drastic
changes in nature and structure, for the world itself has changed, and many
problems not foreseen in those early days of postwar fatigue and hope have
arisen as results of new conflicting forces and ideologies. It is not enough to
blame each other for the present sorrow in the world. We are all to blame, and
each will be blamed by tomorrow's generations unless each does his share to end
it.
To those nations which belong to the family
of the affluent I would like to make an appeal: transcend limitations of
national or local interest and dismiss feelings of superiority. The
relationship of the affluent and the impoverished but developing societies must
not be based on such assumptions and cannot be contrived by political
manipulation. The better world we hope for will be inhabited by men possessed
of their full dignity and rights and conscious of their plain duty. To fulfill
that hope should be the ethical purpose of the United Nations, which is the
institutionalized manifestation of the society of man.
-----
Adam Malik was Foreign Minister of Indonesia (1968-1978)

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